



Reading FC Terrorism Risk Assessment

Description of Event: Primarily Men's, U21s but also Reading Half Marathon. The football is played on the pitch and the Half Marathon's finishing line is within the stadium but the route is around Reading and Green Park. There is an unfenced perimeter within which there are several car parking areas, the Dome, a 3G pitch close to the Dome, Community Trust portacabins, outside eateries and also some RFC owned portacabins. There are 2 vehicle access points leading to vehicle parking areas plus one pedestrian access point to the car parking areas. There are typically around 14,000 attendees for Men's matches, 300 for Under 21s and 6,000 for the Half Marathon. There is one designated food and retail site within the concert area containing approximately 10 - 12 concessions. Within the stadium there are around 10 concourse eateries plus hospitality areas on the first and second floors. Maps of the site are accessible within the Operations Manual. On a Men's match day there are around 150 security staff and for an Under 21s match it is about 4. For the Half Marathon there are about 30 security staff and many volunteers. The security staff are all SIA accredited or have a Level 2,3 or 4 NVQ or equivalent or are enrolled so defined working towards. There is a designated public transport hub for buses and taxis.

Responsible Person: Safety Officer or event organizer for the Half Marathon

Competent Person(s): Safety Officer

Description of Process: Joint planning between the event organiser/safety officer and security providers of which some are RFC employees and some are agency staff. A SLA is in place for all agency staff. Engagement with the Local Authority Safety Advisory Group (SAG) is a regular occurrence. Planning carried out in accordance with the Green, Orange and Purple Guides but additionally taking account of terrorism risk via the CTSA who reviews the PSIA/SASS twice a year as a minimum.

Date of Original Assessment: March 2023

Date of this Review: August 2025

Date of Next Review: August 2026

What are the Threats?	Possible Harm?	Controls already in place [This is not an exhaustive list]	Decisions, further actions and responsibilities [ProtectUK should be used to identify additional measures that can be taken]	Progress reviews
[NaCTSO identify 6 key threats that you may choose to base your assessment on, if you do this you should explain why you have not included any attack types] Five of the six attack types identified in the guidance have been identified as relevant. The site is remote and has little computer infrastructure that could be exploited for a terrorist purpose. 1. Marauding Terrorist Attack (an attack by an individual or group of individuals using a gun or a bladed or blunt force weapon)	[As the event organiser of the site you will need to assess the impact on your business] Each of these attack types could cause death or injury to participants and staff. In all cases the event/match would likely be cancelled which would have severe financial impact on the organisers. Failure to properly identify risks and mitigating measures could lead to reputational damage and possibly prosecution. In addition, attacks of type 2 (bomb), 3 (vehicle) and 4 (fire) could cause significant damage to the stages which might result in further hazards. 6 (Cyber) could result in computerized systems malfunctioning or failing which could result in significant consequences. Note, any of the impacts of the attack types could be exacerbated	All volunteer and security staff are briefed on security awareness. Applicable to all attack types. There is a procedure in place to identify concessions and approved vehicles. Applicable to attack types 1,2, 4 and 5 [Where existing measures exist, such as fire plans or Health and Safety measures, a reference to the document should be included to ensure alignment] Search and screening is in place for all access points. This is supervised by SIA licence holders or directly employed RFC staff (SGSA exemption) and has a clear prohibited items policy in line with ground regs.	Temporary Hostile Vehicle Mitigations at key locations is in place for Men's matches and is managed by CSP. It is not a BS approved deployment but instead a flat bed vehicle which affords some limited protection. As the road entries are on a steep incline this assists in slowing down any hostile vehicles. The site is shared with the Voco Hotel and also bus services on Men's matches.	Review evaluation of options in 6 Months or sooner if CTSA advises or something becomes apparent.
			Good CCTV monitoring at key locations. This can be viewed from 3 locations on the site.	Review evaluation of options in 12 months.
			A tabletop exercise with multi agency participants is run annually and security plans and deployments amended as seen fit.	Next one in Jan 2026.
			ACT e-learning and SCan training undertaking by security staff and also tool box training run at every match.	Remind new staff at the start of next season.

2. Improvised Explosive Device (a bomb that can placed, posted or carried into or close to the site) 3. Vehicle as a Weapon (deliberate use of a vehicle to kill, maim or injure people) 4. Fire as a Weapon (deliberate use of fire to kill, maim or injure people or to cause damage to the site)	if they resulted in a crowd surge.	Key locations on site (e.g. the key power areas) are monitored and patrolled by SIA accredited security staff or directly employed RFC staff. Crowd monitoring is also carried out by stewarding staff and by way of the CCTV system. There is a public communication strategy covering the use of the tannoy system in emergency situations.	Assessments as to whether there are sufficient SIA accredited security staff and RFC staff on site and how they are used and adjusted as necessary. Police categories A (high), B (medium), C (low), Spotter only or Police free used for all matches and agreed with the police.	Carry out review for each match/event.
			Deterrence communications on the event website.	Review proposals in 12 months.
			Assessed options for and feasibility of introducing road traffic control measures, including road closures, beyond the site perimeter considered and CSAS staff used to undertake this. Road closures on site and one way systems are also options employed.	Review in 6 months with LA and Green Park plus Costco.
What are the Threats?	Possible Harm?	Controls already in place [This is not an exhaustive list]	Decisions, further actions and responsibilities [ProtectUK should be used to identify additional measures that can be taken]	Progress reviews
5. CBRN (use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear means to poison or otherwise cause harm to people) 6. Other attack methodologies in the guidance document (e.g. CYBER) have been considered but are not thought to be relevant for this site.		There is an ambulance and para-medical team on site throughout with facilities for a triage site as well as the 2 medical rooms for the public and the players' medical room in the tunnel area. 2 ambulances are on site for men's games, 1 for women's and the Half Marathon event organizer employs SIA staff for this event.	Access control to staff and visitors for all matches introduced to prevent unwanted entries. Salto systems in the building and turnstiles for fans (print at home, paper ticket, membership card, mobile phone).	Develop ideas and review in 12 months.

